

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities

REFERENCES:

- a. Memo from Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, to DCI dated 8 May 1959, same subject;
- b. Memo from DCI to Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dated 26 May 1959, same subject;
- c. Memo for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and Assistant Director for Operations from Lt. Col. William A. Stewart, Chief, AFIC-2A2d, and

STATSPEC

[REDACTED] dated 7 January 1960, subject: Transmittal of Report on Propaganda Analysis and Indications of Hostilities.

STATSPEC

1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the DDCI. Such requested action is contained in paragraph nine.

STATSPEC 2. In his memorandum of 8 May to the DCI (reference a.), General Walsh

set forth certain Air Force proposals for more extensive research by the [REDACTED] to provide timely information to the world wide Indications Warning System. This propaganda analysis would consist of in-depth research in propaganda during previous crisis situations to provide a basis for anticipating possible Soviet views and actions during current and future crises.

3. The DCI, in his reply of 26 May (reference b.) to General Walsh, endorsed the Air Force thinking on the analysis of propaganda as a source of indications of hostile intent. The DCI also indicated that it would be desirable if this problem were further discussed by representatives of [REDACTED] and Air Force.

STATSPEC

DOCUMENT NO. 47
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
1. DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1/1/80
DATE: 1/1/80 REVIEWER:

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

STATSPEC

STATSPEC

4. As a result of the DCI memo of 26 May, [REDACTED] and Lt. Col. William A. Stewart, Chief, AWCIN-2A2A, made an extensive study of the problem and their findings are incorporated in a memo to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, and the Assistant Director for Operations dated 7 January 1960 (reference c.).

STATSPEC

5. Reference c. suggests the formation of an additional section in [REDACTED] to deal with analysis in depth on various past, present, and future crisis areas and situations, and to provide a rapid comparison of current with past crisis patterns as an indication of hostilities. This proposed section would require the addition of 19 positions to [REDACTED] table of organization and would cost an approximate \$157,000 on an annual basis. Additional space would be required. It is also probable that the project would impose additional pressure on [REDACTED]

STATSPEC

STATSPEC

[REDACTED] which might necessitate a slight increase in [REDACTED] T/O. If it is determined that this additional propaganda analysis is necessary and if the project is approved by the Director, we believe that it can be initiated with four additional analysts and four research assistants, expanding to the full suggested T/O only if the results are highly satisfactory.

STATSPEC

STATSPEC

6. Under present budgetary and personnel limitations the Office of Operations would find it impossible to absorb the additional personnel and funds required for this project. We feel strongly that such a program should not be considered at the possible expense of some other [REDACTED]

STATSPEC

~~SECRET~~

activity. Additional ceiling positions and funds would therefore be required. In the last sentence of Paragraph 9 of his memo of 6 May, General Walsh states that "Air Force Intelligence is prepared to cooperate to the maximum extent practicable." It is not apparent whether this would mean the provision of personnel and funds, and we believe that it is somewhat premature to discuss this with the Air Force.

STATSPEC

7. There is a further problem in that the project is designed primarily for the benefit of the Air Force although the Director, National Indications Center, has expressed a considerable amount of interest. As [REDACTED] operates as a service of common concern it would not appear proper to allocate so much effort to a project primarily of interest to one component.

8. It would be time consuming to submit this project to other USIB members for comment and it might well open the whole problem to endless debate. A more expeditious way to accomplish inter-Agency coordination, we believe, would be to submit the project to the Watch Committee and the Director, National Indications Center, for comment. As both the Watch Committee and the Indications Center are staffed by USIB members, we might then get a consensus without submitting the project to each USIB department and agency separately.

9. It is recommended that:

- a. The DDCI request comments on this project from the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center, and

- 1 -

b. Any steps toward planning for the staffing, funding and acquisition of space for the project await a determination by the Watch Committee as to whether there is, in fact, a broad and urgent requirement for such additional propaganda analysis, and approval for the DCI.

GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

cc: DD/I ✓

Enclosures:

References a, b, and c.

MEMORANDUM FOR: R.A.J.

Re: [REDACTED] Study of CRISES

Carey proposes trying out the
idea of [REDACTED] analysis of crisis
situations before the Watch Committee
to see if others besides AF are
interested. I think this is a good
idea & recommend you initial Carey's
paper for transmittal to Gen Cabell -

[REDACTED] _____
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)